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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Rocco Chacon appeals, contending the district court erred in several ways. First, he
argued it did not conduct the required analysis under I.C.R. 14 when addressing his objection to
the State's motion for joinder. Furthermore, he asserted that, under the applicable standards, the
district court erred by granting that motion for joinder, as well as denying Mr. Chacon's motion
to sever other charges. Finally, he argued the district court erred by admitting evidence under
I.R.E. 404(b).
The State makes several arguments in response, none of which have merit. Its procedural
arguments are unfounded or, are themselves unpreserved. Its arguments on the merits of the
joinder/severance issue are contrary to the applicable precedent and misrepresent the argument
Mr. Chacon has made. Finally, its argument for harmless error on the propensity issue fails to
argue under the proper standard as recently clarified by the Idaho Supreme Court. For all these
reasons, this Court should reject the State's arguments and grant Mr. Chacon relief for the
district court's errors.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Chacon's Appellant's Brief

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.

1

ISSUES
I.

Whether the district court erred by denying Mr. Chacon's motion to sever the charges in
this case.

II.

Whether the district court erred by admitting evidence of Mr. Chacon's prior drug use
and possession of paraphernalia in violation ofl.R.E. 404(b).

2

ARGUMENT
I.
The District Court Erred By Denying Mr. Chacon's Motions To Sever The Charges In This Case

A.

Mr. Chacon's Arguments Against The State's Motion To Join The Methamphetamine
Charge Were Sufficient To Preserve His Appellate Arguments Under I.C.R. 14
As the Idaho Supreme Court recently pointed out, its precedent had been unclear with

regard to the appropriate analyses under I.C.R. 8 and I.C.R. 14. State v. Nava,_ Idaho_,
465 P.3d 1123, 1128 (2020). Specifically, I.C.R. 8 deals with whether joinder is appropriate as a
matter of law, while I.C.R. 14 examines whether an otherwise-proper joinder should still be
disallowed because of the risk of undue prejudice. Id. at 1128-29. As such, the Supreme Court
explained, when a question of proper joinder is raised, the courts start by evaluating whether
joinder was proper under I.C.R. 8, and then evaluate whether the risk of undue prejudice should
still require separate trials under I. C.R. 14 (provided both aspects of that argument were made).
Id.

As such, even though the arguments in Nava were "blended," in that they contained
assertions relevant to the analysis under I.C.R. 8 and others that were relevant to the analysis
under I.C.R. 14, the Supreme Court determined it was appropriate to analyze the joinder decision
under both rules on appeal. See id. at 1129-33. In other words, the defendant's "blended"
arguments in that case persevered both issues because they took a position on the issue of joinder
under both rules, and both those positions had been maintained on appeal. See, e.g., Ada County
Highway Dist. v. Brooke View, Inc., 162 Idaho 138, 142 n.2 (2017) (explaining it was

appropriate for the parties to present additional authorities in support of the arguments on appeal
so long as they were maintaining the same position they took on the issue below). As the Idaho

3

Supreme Court subsequently added, such arguments will preserve an issue for appeal even when
the arguments made on below are vague - so long as "the bedrock" of the argument is present in
the record and the district court made a determination on the issue, the issue is properly
preserved for appeal. State v. Godwin, 164 Idaho 903, 914 (2019).
Nevertheless, the State contends that Mr. Chacon's "blended" arguments below did not
preserve either issue for appeal. (Resp. Br., p.11.) That argument flies directly in the face of

Nava, Brooke View, and Godwin.

In fact, it blatantly ignores the fact that, in making his

objection to the State's joinder motion, Mr. Chacon specifically referred the Court back to his
motion to sever the four original charges, which he had expressly based on I.C.R. 14. (Tr., p.75,
Ls.21-22 ("Your Honor, the same objection as before with regard to the firearm."); see
R., pp.156-57 (the motion in which Mr. Chacon had made his arguments with regard to the
firearm charge).) Thus, the State's assertion that on appeal - that he never "cited" I.C.R. 14 in
support of his objection to joining the methamphetamine (Resp. Br., p.11) - mischaracterizes the
record on this point. 1

1

The State's argument in this regard - in essence, that cross-applying a prior argument, with all
its citations to authority, is not enough to "cite" authority in support of the new argument - is
particularly disingenuous because the State purports to make precisely the same sort of argument
in its brief In responding to the merits of Mr. Chacon's challenge to the denial of his motion to
sever the initial four charges, the State's argument is, in its entirety:
For this proposition [that there was no prejudice from the joinder of those
charges], the state adopts the reasoning set forth by the district court at the hearing
on those motions.
(Resp. Br., p.14.) Presumably, the State would assert that, by referencing this Court back to the
district court's analysis, it has offered argument and citation to authority as required by State v.
Zichko, 129 Idaho 259, 263 (1996), even though it did not reiterate all the specific points of the
referenced analysis in its brief. If the State's argument to that effect is sufficient to satisfy
Zichko, then Mr. Chacon's argument below was sufficient to preserve his arguments under
I.C.R. 14. Of course, if this Court disagrees with that premise, then it should reverse the district
court's decision to not sever the initial four counts because the State would have waived that
4

Regardless, Mr. Chacon's "blended" arguments were, just like the arguments in Nava,
sufficient to preserve his argument on appeal under I.C.R. 14. 2 Specifically, he contended below
that joining the methamphetamine charge was inappropriate because there was a risk the joinder
would allow for a conviction based on improper propensity analysis, which would be
impermissibly prejudicial. (Tr., p.75, Ls.8-19.) Nava made it clear that this sort of argument is
properly made under I.C.R. 14. See, e.g., Nava, 465 P.3d at 1132-33 (identifying the risk that a
verdict will be based on propensity analyses as one of the types of prejudice against which
I.C.R. 14 protects, and then evaluating whether the evidence would have been admissible in
separate trials to determine if that type of prejudice existed). As such, the bedrock, if not the
entire structure, of Mr. Chacon's appellate arguments under I.C.R. 14 are present in his
arguments below on the record. He has maintained the same position with respect to that issue
on appeal - that, had the district court conducted the required analysis under I.C.R. 14, it would
have denied the State's motion for joinder on that basis. (App. Br., pp.9-12.) Therefore, for the
reasons laid out in Brooke View and Godwin, those appellate arguments were properly preserved
for appeal, especially given Nava's recognition that there was confusion in the law which would
affect the way such arguments were made.
For all these reasons, this Court should reject the State's preservation arguments and
consider the merits of his severance arguments.

issue on appeal and there is no question as to whether Mr. Chacon preserved that issue below.
(See R., pp.156-57 (Mr. Chacon's written motion to sever the initial four charges, specifically
citing I.C.R. 14).)
2
Whether or not Mr. Chacon chose to pursue the aspects of his arguments below which spoke to
I.C.R. 8 in this appeal is irrelevant to whether the aspects of his arguments under I.C.R. 14 were
sufficient to preserve his arguments in that regard for appeal. (See generally Resp. Br., pp. 7-10
(arguing about how the charges were properly joined as a matter oflaw under I.C.R. 8).)
5

B.

The State's Argument Based On I.C.R. 47 Was Not Preserved Below, And It Is
Inconsistent With The Plain Language Of That Rule In Several Respects
The State's other procedural argument - that Mr. Chacon's objection to the State's

motion to join the methamphetamine charge was not made in writing pursuant to I.C.R. 47
(Resp. Br., pp. I 0-13) - is erroneous because it is directly contrary to the plain language of that
rule in several respects. First, though, the prosecutor never raised any argument under that rule
below. (See generally R., Tr.) Therefore, this Court should reject the State's appellate argument
on that separate procedural issue because it was not preserved for appeal. See, e.g., State v.
Wolfe, 165 Idaho 338, 341-42 (2019) (refusing to consider the State's new, separate argument on

appeal); State v. Fuller, 163 Idaho 585, 591 (2018) (same); State v. Garcia-Rodriguez,

162

Idaho 271, 274-75 (2017) (same).
At any rate, the State's arguments are improper under I.C.R. 47 itself

Specifically,

subsection (b) of the rule provides:
A motion, except when made during a trial or hearing, must be made in writing,
unless the court permits the party to make the motion by other means. A motion
must state the grounds on which it is based and the relief or order sought. A
motion may be supported by affidavit.
I.C.R. 47(b). That rule is inapplicable to Mr. Chacon's arguments on the methamphetamine
charge because, procedurally speaking, he was not the moving party - the State was. 3
Specifically, the State had filed a written motion asking the district court to join the

3

The way Mr. Chacon structured his Appellant's Brief may have contributed to the State's
confusion in this regard. Mr. Chacon separately addressed the district court's failure to conduct
the analysis under I.C.R. 14 with respect to his objection to the State's motion to join the
methamphetamine charge in Section I(B) of his Appellant's Brief. However, in Section I(C), he
jointly discussed the merits of the decision to grant the State's motion to join the
methamphetamine charge alongside the merits of the decision to deny Mr. Chacon's motion to
sever the initial four charges, as the analysis on both issues was the same under I.C.R. 14.
Mr. Chacon apologizes for any confusion the construction or terminology in his Appellant's
Brief may have caused in this regard.
6

methamphetamine charges to the other, already-pending charges, and it noticed up a hearing on
that motion for less than two weeks later. (R., pp.192-97.) At that hearing, the district court
asked for additional input from the parties, and Mr. Chacon objected to the State's motion,
arguing that joinder was not proper under I.C.R. 14. (See generally Tr., p.74, L.10 - p.76, L.4.)
After hearing those arguments, the district court granted the State's motion and formally joined
the charges. (Tr., p.76, L.15 - p.78, L.4; see also R., p.201 (the formal order ofjoinder).)
In fact, since the methamphetamine charge had not actually been joined at the time
Mr. Chacon made his arguments, there was nothing he could actually "move" to sever at that
time. Cf Nava, 465 P.3d at 1127 (rejecting a narrow interpretation of I.C.R. 14 that would
render a motion to sever under I.C.R. 14 as a defendant's exclusive remedy from prejudicial
joinder). In other words, he was arguing on the second part of the analysis required with respect
the State's motion for joinder - that the district court should not grant the motion for joinder
because, even if joinder were proper under I.C.R. 8, the joinder would still be impermissibly
prejudicial under I.C.R. 14. See Nava, 465 P.3d at 1128-29 (reaffirming that, when the district
court analyzes a motion for joinder, it first determines whether joinder is proper under I.C.R. 8
and then analyzes whether such a joinder would be impermissibly prejudicial under I.C.R. 14).
As such, Mr. Chacon's arguments at the hearing are better described as his objection to the
State's motion for joinder, not a motion in and of themselves, and since he was not making a
motion, I.C.R. 47 does not apply.
Even if I.C.R. 47 were generally applicable in regard to an objection to the other party's
motion, it still would not apply in this case because there are two exceptions expressly set forth
in the rule which would be controlling in Mr. Chacon's case: that I.C.R. 47 does not apply to
motions "made during a trial or hearing," and it gives the district court the discretion to

7

''permit[] the party to make the motion by other means." I.C.R. 47(b) (emphasis added). Since
the district court invited Mr. Chacon to make his arguments on that issue at the hearing without
first requiring him to file a written objection, record implicitly demonstrates it was exercising
that discretion to exempt Mr. Chacon froml.C.R. 47's requirements. (Tr., p.74, Ls.10-20.)
The State has offered no argument to try to show how the decision to proceed in this
fashion would have been an abuse of the district court's discretion. (See generally Resp. Br.)
Nor could it make such a showing on this record. See Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856,
863-64 (2018) (articulating the standard for evaluating discretionary decisions). That is because
the State scheduled the hearing on its motion for less than two weeks after the motion itself was
filed, and, at that time, the trial was set to occur just one month later. (See R., pp.183, 192.) As
such, the district court's invitation to make oral argument rather than insisting on written filings
first, particularly in the run-up to the trial, was rational and promoted judicial efficiency in this
regard. 4 Thus, even if I.C.R. 47 were generally applicable, the district court's decision to not
insist on written filings from Mr. Chacon in this instance was reasonable.
For any or all these reasons, this Court should reject the State's unfounded and
unpreserved arguments under I.C.R. 47(b).

C.

The District Court Failed To Conduct The Proper Analysis Under I.C.R. 14 With Respect
To Its Decision On The State's Motion To Join The Methamphetamine Charge
The district court did not evaluate whether the evidence of the methamphetamine charge

would have been admissible in separate trials. This is part of the analysis under I.C.R. 14. See,

e.g., Nava, 465 P.3d at 1132-33 (specifically evaluating whether the evidence in that case would

4

The fact that the trial would, subsequently, be continued for other reasons does not change the
reasonableness of the district court's decision to proceed without additional written filings with
respect to the State's motion to join the methamphetamine charge.
8

have been admissible in separate trials as part of its analysis under I.C.R. 14).

Thus, as

Mr. Chacon argued, the district court abused its discretion by not conducting that required
analysis. See State v. Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho 757, 762-63 (2015) (holding the district court
abused its discretion by not conducting the required analysis with respect to a joinder motion),
abrogated on other grounds by Nava, 465 P.3d at 1128.

The State's only response in this regard was to reassert the district court's conclusion that the jury would be able to "sort through" the charges, and thus, consider the
methamphetamine charge separate from the other charges. (Resp. Br., p.12.) However, the State
completely fails to mention Orellana-Castro in making that argument. (See generally Resp.
Br., pp.10-13.) That is disconcerting because, in Orellana-Castro, the Idaho Supreme Court
rejected the very argument which the State is trying to make in this regard, and that portion of
Orellana-Castro remains good law following Nava. See Nava, 465 P.3d at 1128 (disavowing
Orellana-Castro only insofar as it purported to create a single standard of review for both

I.C.R. 8 and I.C.R. 14).
In Orellana-Castro, as here, the district court only determined that any prejudice which
might arise from the joinder in that case would be alleviated by instructing the jury to consider
each count separately; it did not evaluate whether the evidence would have been admissible in
separate trials under I.R.E. 404(b). Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 762. The State adopted that
position on appeal, and so, sought to argue the district court's error in failing to conduct the
required analysis was harmless. Id. The Supreme Court rejected that position, stating: "That
instruction [to consider the charges separately] is insufficient to alleviate the prejudice from

9

improper joinder," which was the risk that the evaluation of the separate charges would be
tainted by an improper propensity analysis. 5 Id.
Nevertheless, the State is trying to make that same argument again in this case - that
because the jury could, and in some cases, did, consider the charges separately, there was no
prejudice from the joinder of all the charges. (Resp. Br., p.10.) However, just as in OrellanaCastro, there is still a risk that the jury's consideration of the charges as separate entities still

could have been affected by an impermissible propensity analysis.

Therefore, just as in

Orellana-Castro, the State's argument fails to prove the district court's error in failing to conduct

the required analysis, was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

See also Montgomery v.

Montgomery, 14 7 Idaho 1, 6-7 (2009) (explaining that, "[w ]hen the discretion exercised by a trial

court is affected by an error oflaw, the role of the appellate court is to note the error made and
remand the case for appropriate findings").
The State's argument in this regard is also directly contrary to the Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559, 565 (2007). Specifically, the State contended there
was no potential for prejudice because the jury ultimately acquitted Mr. Chacon on two of the
five charges against him. (Resp. Br., p.12.) However, in Field, the Supreme Court made it clear
that "[w]hether joinder is proper is 'determined by what is alleged, not what the proof eventually
shows."' Field, 144 Idaho at 565 (quoting State v. Cochran, 97 Idaho 71, 73 (1975)) (emphasis

added). In fact, "'where, as here, the charge which originally justified joinder turns out to lack

5

Unlike Mr. Chacon, Orellana-Castro dealt with two charges of sexual misconduct. See
Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 761-62 As the Supreme Court has pointed out, such charges carry
a particularly-significant risk of prejudice in terms of propensity See State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho
664, 670 (2010). However, that does not change the fact that part of the analysis under I.C.R. 14
is weighing the potential prejudice in terms of propensity, and thus, the district court's failure to
conduct that portion of the analysis is an abuse of its discretion. Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at
762.

the support of sufficient evidence, a trial judge should be particularly sensitive to the possibility
of such prejudice."' Cochran, 97 Idaho at 74 (quoting Schaffer v. United States, 362 U.S. 511,

515-16 (1960)) (emphasis added). Thus, the State's focus on what the proof eventually showed
was wholly improper.
In other words, what Field, Cochran, and Schaffer recognize is that the fact that jury may
have found the State did not carry its burden on two of the charges offers little insight into
whether the three convictions it did return were improperly influenced by the prejudicial joinder
of those charges. 6 See, e.g., Cochran, 97 Idaho at 73-74; see also Nava, 465 P.3d at 1129
(reiterating the concern in this regard is that the jury will find the defendant guilty of another
crime simply because they found him guilty of one of the charged offenses). The warning in
Cochran and Schaffer, in particular, suggests the potential concern that improper joinder might

lead to the jury simply "splitting the baby" in rendering acquittals on some charges and
convictions on others. See also Nava, 465 P.3d at 1129 (reiterating that I.C.R. 14 is designed to
address a broad scope of potential prejudice). This is, in part, why Orellana-Castro held that the
jury instruction to consider each charge separately was not sufficient to fully address the
potential prejudice from joinder. See Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 762-63. Therefore, the fact
that acquittals were ultimately rendered on some charges does not show the joinder was not
prejudicial. As such, this Court should disregard the State's argument in this regard, as it is
contrary to clear Supreme Court precedent.
The State's argument in this regard is further revealed to be erroneous because it is based
on a misapplication of State v. Wilske, 158 Idaho 643 (Ct. App. 2015). (See Resp. Br., pp.126

Mr. Chacon specifically challenged the joinder of each of the three charges for which he was
ultimately convicted. (See R., p.156 (moving for the eluding charge to be tried separately from
the unlawful possession of the firearm); Tr., p.74, L.21 - p.76, L.2 (objecting to the subsequent
joinder of the methamphetamine charge to all the others).)
11

13.) While the State is correct, in that Wilske points out that, whether the evidence would have
been admissible in separate trials under I.R.E. 404(b) is not determinative with respect to the
analysis under I.C.R. 14, Wilske, 158 Idaho at 645-46, 7 that does not make Wilske controlling in,
or even applicable to, Mr. Chacon's case. That is because, in Wilske, the district court actually
considered the risk that joinder would allow for improper propensity influences to affect the

verdicts. Id. at 646-47 (ultimately concluding there was not a significant risk of propensity
influence, given the facts of that case). As such, Wilske is wholly irrelevant to the issue in
Mr. Chacon's case, which is focused on the district court's failure to conduct that part of the
analysis at all.

That particular issue was directly addressed one month after Wilske, in the

Supreme Court's decision in Orellana-Castro. 8 Therefore, Orellana-Castro, not Wilske, controls
the analysis in Mr. Chacon's case.
Under the actually-controlling case law, the district court abused its discretion by not
conducting a part of the required analysis under I.C.R. 14 with respect to the methamphetamine
charge.

That error was prejudicial because there was a significant risk that the jury's

determination on the methamphetamine charge could be affected by the risk of propensity
evidence, particularly in relation to the possession of the firearm charge. See, e.g., State v.
Pierce, 137 Idaho 296, 299-300 (Ct. App. 2002) (acknowledging there is a "recognized

propensity of persons engaged in selling narcotics to carry firearms"). Therefore, as in OrellanaCastro, this Court should vacate the conviction and remand the case for proper evaluation of the

state's motion to join the methamphetamine charge. See Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 762-63.

7

See also Nava, 465 P.3d at 1129 (noting the evaluation of prejudice under I.C.R.14 extends
beyond the scope ofl.R.E. 404(b))
8
To any extent Wilske and Orellana-Castro are incompatible, Orellana-Castro would have
abrogated Wilske. See State v. Clinton, 155 Idaho 271,272 n.1 (2013).

12

D.

The District Court's Decisions To Allow All The Charges To Proceed To Trial Together
Were Erroneous Under The Proper Standards For I.C.R. 14
Mr. Chacon has maintained that the district court decisions - to deny his motion to sever

the original charges and to grant the State's subsequent motion to join the methamphetamine
charge - were not consistent with the applicable standards under I.C.R. 14 because any potential
relevance each charge had to the others was outweighed by the risk of undue prejudice. (App.
Br., pp.11-12.) The fact that Mr. Chacon used the methamphetamine charge as the primary
example to illustrate the lack of relevance in that regard does not, as the State believes, mean he
failed to offer argument or authority with regard to his motion to sever the other charges. (See
Resp. Br., p.) In fact, the State's argument fails to appreciate that Mr. Chacon did, in fact, make
a specific argument which addressed all three of charges for which he was convicted: "evidence
of unlawful possession of methamphetamine or a firearm says little about whether the car was
being driven in a reckless manner while being signaled to stop, so as to help prove felony
eluding." 9 (App. Br., p.12.) He made that argument under the same authority as his other
arguments in that regard (Orellana-Castro, 158 Idaho at 760). Therefore, the State's attempt to
have his argument in that regard waived under Zichko for failure to make argument or cite
authority is meritless. (Resp. Br., p.13.)
The State has not offered any further argument of its own on the merits of the district
court's decisions to have a joint trial with all five charges; rather, it simply adopted the district
court's analysis in that regard. (Resp. Br., p.14.) As explained in Section I(C) supra, as well as
in the Appellant's Brief, pages 11-12, the district court's analysis in that regard was contrary to

9

As Mr. Chacon indicated out at the outset of his Appellant's Brief, the acquittals on the other
two charges will prevent a retrial on those charges. (See App. Br., p.1 n.1.) As such, there was
no reason to further address the propriety of the joinder of those two charges, since any argument
in that regard was rendered moot by the acquittals.
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the applicable precedent. As such, no further reply in that regard is needed. Mr. Chacon simply
refers this Court back to those applicable arguments and supporting authorities.

II.
The District Court Erred By Admitting Evidence Of Mr. Chacon's Prior Drug Use And
Possession Of Paraphernalia In Violation Ofl.R.E. 404(b)

A.

Mr. Chacon's Relevancy And Prejudice Objections Preserved His Arguments Under
I.R.E. 404(b)
As the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly made clear, the analysis under I.R.E. 404(b)

contains two major components - a determination of relevancy and an evaluation of whether the
risk of undue prejudice substantially outweighs the probative value. E.g., State v. Samuel, 165
Idaho 746, 769-70 (2019) (reiterating the analysis under I.R.E. 404(b)). The Courts have often
compared the analysis on these two prongs to the analysis under I.R.E. 401 and I.R.E. 403
respectively. See, e.g., State v. Jones,_ P.3d _ , 2020 WL 2111375, **4 & 5 (May 4, 2020)
(quoting I.R.E. 401 while conducting the analysis under the first step of I.R.E. 404(b ), and
quoting I.R.E. 403 while conducting the analysis under the second step), petition for reh 'g

pending; accord State v. Diaz, 158 Idaho 629, 635-36 (Ct. App. 2015) (specifically citing
I.R.E. 401 and 403 in conducting the analysis under I.R.E. 404(b)); State v. Cook, 144 Idaho 784,
788-89 & n.3 (Ct. App. 2007) (same). As a result, the Idaho Court of Appeals has expressly held
that a relevancy objection can and will preserve an argument under I.R.E. 404(b) for appeal,
when the thrust of the objection is aimed at the same bases which I.R.E. 404(b) addresses. State

v. Avila, 137 Idaho 410, 412-13 (Ct. App. 2002).
Nevertheless, in blatant disregard of that clear precedent directly on point, the State still
asserted that Mr. Chacon's I.R.E. 404(b) arguments were not preserved. (Resp. Br., pp.15-16.)
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The only two cases it cited in support of its position - State v. Vondenkamp, 141 Idaho 878
(Ct. App. 2005); State v. Norton, 134 Idaho 875 (Ct. App. 2000) - do not so much as mention
I.R.E. 401 or I.R.E. 403, or even 404(b). As such, those two cases are of negligible value in
resolving the preservation issue, especially when there are other decisions so directly on point.
In fact, one of the cases which is directly on point actually and expressly rejected this sort of
preservation argument based on Norton specifically in light of the decision in Avila. State v.
Teasley, 138 Idaho 113, 117 (Ct. App. 2002).

The Court of Appeals laid out the relevant analysis in its decision in State v. McAbee, 130
Idaho 517, 518-19 (Ct. App. 1997).

In that case, while I.R.E. 404(b) was not specifically

mentioned in the arguments below:
in a series of arguments regarding the admissibility of this evidence that occurred
throughout the trial, the State asserted that the evidence was relevant for purposes
permitted by Rule 404(b), including the purpose of showing McAbee's intent,
opportunity to commit the charged crime, and absence of mistake or accident.
McAbee's attorney countered with arguments that the permissible purposes
enumerated in Rule 404(b) were not applicable and also urged that the evidence
should be excluded because it would be unfairly prejudicial.
McAbee, 130 Idaho at 518-19. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals held, "the issue framed in the

appellant's brief [under I.R.E. 404(b)] was sufficiently preserved for appeal" by the arguments
below. Id. at 519; accord Avila, 137 Idaho at 412-13 (distinguishing State v. Cannady, 137
Idaho 67 (2002), for this same reason - the objection in Cannady did not invoke the principles of
relevancy that are at issue under I.R.E. 404(b ), whereas the objection in Avila did). The analysis
underlying the decisions in McAbee and Avila was recently reaffirmed by the Idaho Supreme
Court in Godwin: so long as "the bedrock of the argument is present in the record and the
district court made a determination on the issue," the issue is sufficiently preserved for appeal,
even if the argument below was vague. Godwin, 164 Idaho at 914; compare Jones,_ P.3d
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_ , 2020 WL 2111375, **8-9 (holding that relevance and prejudice objections are not sufficient
to preserve an argument that the prosecutor failed to give sufficient notice as required by
I.R.E. 404(b) specifically because that aspect of I.R.E. 404(b) was not apparent form the context
of the arguments made below).
Here, as in McAbee, the prosecutor's arguments for relevance of the drug paraphernalia
went directly to the purposes articulated in I.R.E. 404(b) - specifically, Mr. Chacon's knowledge
and intent in terms of possessing the methamphetamine. (Tr., p.640, Ls.9-13, p.641, Ls.8-12.)
Mr. Chacon, like the defendant in McAbee, objected along those same lines, and also argued that
evidence would be more prejudicial than probative. (Tr., p.639, Ls.1-16, p.640, L.16 - p.641,
L.2.) Therefore, as in McAbee, Avila, and Teasley, the context of the arguments below clearly
relates to the principles at issue under both prongs of I.R.E. 404(b ), and thus, preserved his
appellate arguments framed under I.R.E. 404(b ).
As such, this Court should reject the State's preservation argument, as it 1s clearly
improper under the actually-applicable precedent.

B.

The Evidence Of Mr. Chacon's Prior Drug Use And Possession Of Paraphernalia Was
Not Relevant Except Through An Improper Propensity Analysis, And/Or The Risk Of
Undue Prejudice Substantially Outweighed Any Potential Probative Value
The State's arguments with respect to the merits of the analysis under I.R.E. 404(b) (or,

as the State would have it, under I.R.E. 401 and I.R.E. 403; the arguments are the same
whichever way they are framed) are unremarkable. In fact, the State's argument with respect to
the prejudice portion of the analysis constitutes a single, conclusory sentence which probably
does not satisfy the requirements of Zichko, 129 Idaho at 263, since it does not cite authority to
support the argument. (See Resp. Br., p.17; see generally Resp. Br., pp.16-19.) Either way, no
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further reply is necessary on the merits of this issue; Mr. Chacon simply refers the Court back to
pages 13-15 of his Appellant's Brief

C.

State Failed To Argue The Proper Standard For Harmless Error
Despite citing to the Idaho Supreme Court's recent decision in State v. Garcia, 166 Idaho

661, _, 462 P.3d 1125 (2020), in another portion of its brief, the State did not mention that
decision in its argument that any error in admitting the paraphernalia or prior drug use was
harmless. 10

(See generally Resp. Br., pp.19-21.)

That is problematic, because the State's

argument for harmless error is incompatible with the new standard articulated in Garcia.
Specifically, the State asserts an error will be harmless if "'beyond a reasonable doubt, a
rational jury would have convicted [the defendant] even without the admission of the challenged
evidence."' (Resp. Br., p.19.) The State proceeds to argue that, because of all the other evidence
it presented, the jury still would have convinced Mr. Chacon even without the error. (Resp.
Br., pp.19-21.) However, the State's argument only discusses the evidence in terms of viewing it
favorably to the State's view of the case; it leaves out the aspects of the evidence that are
favorable to Mr. Chacon, such as the gaps in the chain of custody of the methamphetamine and
the impact of the error on the jury's evaluation of those points. (See generally Resp. Br.) As
such, the State's argument in this regard is actually revealed to be an argument for
"overwhelming evidence."

Unfortunately for the State, Garcia made eminently clear that

"overwhelming evidence" is not a permissible basis upon which to argue harmless error. Garcia,
462 P.3d at 1138-39. Therefore, this Court should reject the State's harmless error argument
outright.
10

The State's only citations to Garcia do not discuss the harmless error standard it adopted, but
rather, only discuss refer to Garcia for its discussion about determining whether evidence is
relevant. (See Resp. Br., pp.16, 17-18.)
17

To this same point, the State's argument failed to address fully half of the relevant
standard for harmless error. As Garcia made clear, the harmless error test actually turns on a
comparison between the probative force of the other evidence against the probative force of the
error itself Garcia, 462 P.3d at 1138. Only if the probative effect of the error itself can be said
to be minimal beyond a reasonable doubt when compared with the other evidence will the error
be harmless. Id. Since the State failed to discuss the probative force of the error itself, much less
demonstrate it to be minimal, as it was required to do, (see generally Resp. Br., pp.19-21), this
Court should reject its harmless error argument outright. State v. Almaraz, 154 Idaho 584, 59899 (2013) ("the State never specifically argues that [the error] did not 'contribute to the verdict
obtained' as clearly required under Per,y.[ 11 ] For example, .... As such, the State has failed to
meet its burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the verdict in this case would have
been the same even if [the erroneous evidence] had not been admitted.")
At any rate, for the reasons the improperly-admitted evidence carried a substantial risk of
prejudice, the probative force of the error in admitting the propensity evidence cannot be said to
be "minimal" in the fabric of Mr. Chacon's whole case. For example, as discussed in detail in
the Appellant's Brief, there was a basis for reasonable doubt on the methamphetamine charge
due to the gaps in the chain of custody. (App. Br., p.6.) There was a not-insignificant risk that
the jurors dismissed those doubts based on Mr. Chacon's character as a drug user and his
possession of the paraphernalia. Likewise, as also discussed in detail in the Appellant's Brief,
there were bases for reasonable doubt regarding Mr. Chacon's knowledge that the gun was in the
car. (App. Br., p.6.) There was a not-insignificant risk that the jurors would dismiss those
doubts because of the recognized propensity of those involved in drug culture to carry guns. See

11

State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010).
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Pierce, 137 Idaho at 299-300 (acknowledging this propensity connection exists). Thus, the error

itself had significant probative force, a force that was not rendered minimal when compared to
the other evidence the State presented on those two charges.
In fact, the State's argument, which was based in part on Mr. Chacon's testimony and the
State's rebuttal evidence, demonstrates the probative force of the error. (See Resp. Br., pp.1920.) His strategy, to address and explain his drug use and possession of paraphernalia, was
dictated in no small part by the district court's erroneous decision to allow that evidence to be
admitted in the first place during the State's case-in-chief Thus, the State's reliance on that
evidence actually demonstrates that this error had particular probative force in the overall fabric
of the case, and therefore, actually shows this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
Since the State has failed to argue, much less prove beyond a reasonable doubt, that the
probative force of the error itself was minimal in the context of the whole case, it has failed to
carry its burden to prove that error harmless under the proper standard.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Chacon respectfully requests that this Court vacate his convictions and either remand
this case for separate trials on the remaining charges, or, alternatively, for a new trial without the
inclusion of improper propensity evidence.
DATED this 18th day of August, 2020.

/s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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